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ABSTRACT 
The assessment of patients with disorders of consciousness, including the vegetative state, is 
difficult and depends frequently on subjective interpretations of the observed spontaneous and 
volitional behavior. For those patients who retain peripheral motor function, rigorous behavioral 
assessment supported by structural imaging and electrophysiological findings is usually sufficient 
to establish a patient’s level of wakefulness and awareness. However, it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that in some patients damage to the peripheral motor system may prevent overt 
responses to command although the cognitive ability to perceive and understand such commands 
may remain intact. Recent advances in functional neuroimaging suggest a novel solution to this 
problem; in several cases, so-called activation studies have been used to identify residual 
cognitive function and conscious awareness in patients who are assumed to be in a vegetative 
state yet retain cognitive abilities that have evaded detection using standard clinical methods. 
 
The vegetative state is one of the least understood and most ethically troublesome conditions in 
modern medicine. Vegetative state describes a unique disorder in which patients who emerge 
from coma appear to be awake but show no signs of awareness of self or of environment. At the 
point that the diagnosis is made there must be no evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, 
or voluntary behavioral response to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli. There must also be 
no evidence of language comprehension or expression, although there are generally sufficiently 
preserved hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions to permit survival with medical care. 
An accurate and reliable evaluation of the level and content of cognitive processing is of 
paramount importance for the appropriate management of patients diagnosed as being in a 
vegetative state. 
Objective behavioral assessment of residual cognitive function can be difficult in these patients 
due to the fact that motor responses (the only means of communicating awareness in the absence 
of speech) may be minimal, inconsistent, and difficult to document or may be undetectable 
because no cognitive output is possible. Several recent studies reviewed by Laureys et al1 have 
shown that functional neuroimaging may have an important role in the identification of residual 
cognitive function in some patients who are assumed to be in a vegetative state yet retain cognitive 
abilities that have evaded detection using standard clinical approaches. Unlike resting blood flow 
and glucose metabolism, which provide markers of neural capacity and potential so-called 
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activation methods such as radioactive water positron emission tomography and functional 
magnetic resonance (fMR) imaging can be used to link residual neural activity to the presence of 
covert cognitive function. In short, activation studies have the potential to demonstrate distinct and 
specific physiological responses (changes in regional cerebral blood flow or regional cerebral 
hemodynamics) to controlled external stimulation without the need for any overt behavior (eg, a 
motor action) by the patient. Indeed, in recent years normal or near-normal patterns of brain 
activity have been reported in response to many types of stimuli, including faces, speech, and 
semantically ambiguous sentences in patients meeting all of the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of 
vegetative state.1 
A question that is often asked of such studies is whether the presence of normal brain activation 
in patients who are diagnosed as being in a vegetative state indicates a level of conscious 
awareness, perhaps even similar to that which exists in healthy volunteers when performing the 
same tasks. Many types of stimuli, including faces, speech, and pain, will elicit automatic 
responses from the brain; that is to say, they will occur without the need for willful intervention on 
the part of the participant (eg, you cannot choose to not recognize a face or to not understand 
speech that is presented clearly in your native language). By the same argument, normal neural 
responses in patients who are diagnosed as being in a vegetative state do not necessarily indicate 
that these patients have any conscious experience associated with processing those same types 
of stimuli. Therefore, such patients may retain discreet islands of subconscious cognitive function 
that exist in the absence of awareness. 
This logic exposes a central conundrum in the study of conscious awareness and particularly in 
how it relates to the vegetative state. Deeper philosophical considerations notwithstanding, the 
only reliable method that we have for determining if another being is consciously aware is to ask 
him or her. The answer may take the form of a spoken response or a nonverbal signal (which may 
be as simple as the movement of a hand or a blink of an eye as documented cases of the locked-
in syndrome have demonstrated), but it is this answer that allows us to infer conscious awareness. 
In short, our ability to know unequivocally that another being is consciously aware is ultimately 
determined not by whether or not he or she is aware but instead by his or her ability to 
communicate that fact through a recognized behavioral response. But what if the ability to blink 
an eye or move a hand is lost yet conscious awareness remains? By definition, patients who are 
diagnosed as being in a vegetative state are unable to elicit such behavioral responses. Following 
the logic of this argument, even if such a patient were consciously aware, by definition he or she 
would have no means for conveying that information to the outside world. 
Methods 
We recently described a novel approach to this conundrum, using fMR imaging to demonstrate 
preserved conscious awareness in a patient fulfilling the criteria for a diagnosis of being in a 
vegetative state.2 In mid 2005, the patient was involved in a motor vehicle crash. On admission to 
the hospital, she had a Glasgow Coma Scale score of 4. A computed tomographic image revealed 
diffuse brain swelling, intraventricular blood in the left lateral ventricle, low attenuation in the left 
frontal lobe close to the corpus callosum, and attenuation change in the right frontal and left 
posterior temporal regions. The following day she underwent bifrontal decompressive 
craniectomy, and 1 month later a ventriculoperitoneal shunt was inserted into the right lateral 
ventricle. Between the time of the crash and the fMR imaging in early January 2006, the patient 
was assessed by a multidisciplinary team using repeated standardized assessments consistent 
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with the procedure described by Bates.3 Throughout this period, the patient’s behavior was 
consistent with accepted guidelines defining the vegetative state.4 She opened her eyes 
spontaneously, exhibited sleep-wake cycles, and had preserved but inconsistent reflexive 
behavior (startle, noxious, threat, tactile, and olfactory). No elaborated motor behaviors (regarded 
as voluntary or willed responses) were observed from the upper or lower limbs. There was no 
evidence of orientation, fixation greater than 5 seconds, or tracking to visual or auditory stimuli. 
No overt motor responses to command were observed. 
Before the fMR imaging, the patient was instructed to perform 2 mental imagery tasks when cued 
by the instructions “imagine playing tennis” or “imagine visiting the rooms in your home.” These 
instructions were elaborated outside of the scanner in an attempt to induce a rich and detailed 
mental picture during the imaging. Therefore, one task involved imagining playing a vigorous game 
of tennis, swinging for the ball with forehand and backhand, for the entire duration of each imaging 
block. The other task involved imagining moving slowly from room to room in her house, visualizing 
the location and appearance of each item of furniture as she did so. In a third condition, the patient 
was asked to “just relax.” 
Most important, these particular tasks were chosen not because they involve a set of fundamental 
cognitive processes that are known to reflect conscious awareness but because imagining playing 
tennis and imagining moving around the house elicit reliable, robust, and statistically 
distinguishable patterns of activation in specific regions of the brain. For example, in a series of 
studies2,5 in healthy volunteers, imagining playing tennis has been shown to elicit activity in the 
supplementary motor area, a region involved in imagining (as well as actually performing) 
coordinated movements in 34 participants imaged (Figure 1 ). In contrast, imagining moving from 
room to room in a house commonly activates the parahippocampal cortices, the posterior parietal 
lobe, and the lateral premotor cortices, regions that contribute to imaginary or real spatial 
navigation. Given the reliability of these responses across individuals, activation in these regions 
can be used as a neural marker, confirming that the participant retains the ability to understand 
instructions, carry out different mental tasks in response to those instructions, and exhibit willed 
voluntary behavior in the absence of any overt action. 
When the patient who was clinically diagnosed as being in a vegetative state was asked to imagine 
playing tennis, significant activity was observed in the supplementary motor area that was 
statistically indistinguishable from that observed in healthy awake volunteers (Figure 2).2 In 
contrast, the instruction to imagine walking through the rooms of her house elicited significant 
activity in the parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal cortex, and lateral premotor cortex, which 
was again indistinguishable from that observed in healthy volunteers. Despite her fulfilling all of 
the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of being in a vegetative state, we concluded that this patient 
retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to them through her brain 
activity rather than through speech or movement. Moreover, her decision to cooperate with us by 
imagining particular tasks when asked to do so represented a clear act of intention that confirmed 
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Figure 1. Three healthy volunteers imagine playing tennis during real-time functional magnetic resonance 
(MR) imaging at the Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, England. 
Functional MR imaging data are superimposed on 3-dimensional anatomical reconstructions of structural 
MR data for online examination of brain activity during the imaging period. Similar significant activation is 
observed in the supplementary motor area in all 3 volunteers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Supplementary motor area activity during tennis imagery in a patient diagnosed as being in a 
vegetative state and in a healthy volunteer (left). Parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal lobe, and lateral 
premotor cortex activity while imagining moving around a house in the patient and in a healthy volunteer 
(right). 
 
Skeptics may argue that the words tennis and house could have automatically triggered the 
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patterns of activation observed in the supplementary motor area, parahippocampal gyrus, 
posterior parietal lobe, and lateral premotor cortex in our patient in the absence of conscious 
awareness. However, we know of no data supporting the inference that such stimuli can 
unconsciously elicit sustained hemodynamic responses in these regions of the brain. Indeed, 
considerable data exist to suggest that such words do not elicit the responses that were observed. 
For example, although it is well documented that some words can under certain circumstances 
elicit wholly automatic neural responses in the absence of conscious awareness, such responses 
are typically transient (ie, lasting for a few seconds) and, not surprising, occur in regions of the 
brain that are associated with word processing.6 In our patient, the observed activity was not 
transient but persisted for the full 30 seconds of each imagery task (ie, far longer than would be 
expected given the hemodynamics of the fMR imaging response). In fact, these task-specific 
changes persisted until the patient was cued with another stimulus indicating that she should rest. 
Such responses are impossible to explain in terms of automatic brain processes. In addition, the 
activation observed in the patient was not in brain regions that are known to be involved in word 
processing, but rather was in regions that are known to be involved in the 2 imagery tasks that 
she was asked to carry out. Again, sustained activity in these regions of the brain is impossible to 
explain in terms of unconscious responses to single keywords or to short sentences containing 
those words. In fact, we recently demonstrated that non- instructive sentences containing the 
same keywords as those used with our patient (eg, “the man enjoyed playing tennis”) produce no 
sustained activity in any of these brain regions in healthy volunteers.7 Therefore, the most 
parsimonious explanation is that this patient was consciously aware and was willfully following the 
instructions given to her, despite her diagnosis of being in a vegetative state. 
RELEVANCE TO THE PRACTICE OF NEUROLOGY 
This finding raises several important issues regarding the use of functional neuroimaging in the 
assessment of patients with disorders of consciousness. First, although this technique provides a 
new means for detecting conscious awareness when standard clinical approaches are unable to 
provide that information, the method will not be applicable to all patients in a vegetative state. For 
example, within 6 months of traumatic brain injury (as was the case for the patient described 
herein), the incidence of recovery of consciousness following traumatic brain injury remains at 
almost 20%, with a quarter of those recovering moving on to an independent level of function.8 
Nontraumatic injuries are considered to have a much poorer prognosis. Similarly, the likelihood of 
recovery is much lower in patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for being in a permanent 
vegetative state (the patient described herein did not). International guidelines, including those of 
the Royal College of Physicians in England and the Multi-Society Task Force representing 5 major 
medical societies in the United States, suggest that a diagnosis of being in a permanent vegetative 
state should not be made until 12 months after injury in cases of traumatic brain injury or until 6 
months after injury in cases of anoxic brain injury.8 In many of these cases, standard clinical 
techniques, including structural MR imaging, may be sufficient to rule out any potential for normal 
activation, without the need for fMR imaging. 
That said, although it is almost certainly the case that similar fMR imaging responses will not be 
found in most patients who meet the clinical criteria for being in a vegetative state, there is little a 
priori reason to suppose that this is the only patient for whom this will be the case. In fact, we 
recently assessed a second patient with traumatic brain injury who showed evidence of eye 
opening, sleep-wake cycles, and preserved reflexes but no sustained, reproducible, or purposeful 
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overt behavioral response to sensory or cognitive stimulation. However, he exhibited consistent 
patterns of brain activity when asked to imagine playing a game of soccer. This activity was 
observed in medial and lateral regions of the supplementary motor cortex, consistent with actual 
or imagined movement of the legs and lower body. 
It is important to emphasize that negative functional neuroimaging findings in patients who are 
diagnosed as being in a vegetative state cannot be used as evidence for lack of awareness. For 
example, a patient may fall asleep during the imaging or may not have properly heard or 
understood the task instructions, leading to so-called false-negative results. Nevertheless, positive 
findings, when they occur and can be verified by careful statistical comparison with data from 
healthy volunteers, can be used to detect conscious awareness in patients without the need for 
conventional methods of communication such as movement or speech. On this basis, we suggest 
that functional neuroimaging should be more widely used in the assessment of patients with 
disorders of consciousness and particularly in those for whom existing clinical approaches have 
left some ambiguity about the diagnosis. 
RELEVANCE TO THE STUDY OF NEUROSCIENCE 
In the past 2 decades, rapid technological developments in the field of neuroimaging have 
produced a cornucopia of new techniques for examining the structure and function of the human 
brain in vivo. Detailed anatomical images, acquired through computed tomography and MR 
imaging, can now be combined with positron emission tomography, fMR imaging, quantitative 
electroencephalography, and magneto-encephalography to produce a cohesive picture of normal 
and abnormal brain function. As a result, functional neuroimaging has become the technique of 
choice for neuropsychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and many others in the wider 
neuroscientific community with an interest in the relationship between brain and behavior. Until 
recently, these new methods of investigation have been used primarily as a correlational tool to 
map the cerebral changes that are associated with a particular cognitive process or function, be it 
an action, a thought, or a reaction (eg, to some kind of external stimulation). However, recent 
advances in imaging technology and particularly in the ability of fMR imaging to detect reliable 
neural responses in individual participants in real time are beginning to allow reverse inferences 
to be made (ie, to correctly identify a participant’s thoughts, actions, or intentions based solely on 
the pattern of activity that is observed in his or her brain). The case of the patient described herein 
provides an example of such an application. The fact that she was consciously aware was evident 
only by examination of her time-locked and sustained fMR imaging responses following 
instructions to perform specific mental tasks in the absence of any overt action. On this basis, it 
was possible to infer not only that she was thinking but also what she was thinking at any given 
point in time (within the constraints of the tasks given to her). Similarly, in another study,5 healthy 
volunteers were instructed to choose to imagine playing tennis or navigating around their homes 
without informing the investigators of their choice. It was possible to determine with 100% 
accuracy which task was being performed by each participant during the imaging session based 
solely on his or her brain activity. Finally, in another recent fMR imaging study,9 participants were 
asked to freely decide which of 2 different tasks to perform and to covertly maintain that intention 
during a variable delay. During the delay, it was possible to decode from activity in the prefrontal 
cortex which of the 2 tasks the participants were covertly intending to perform. 
Such feats of rudimentary mind reading using fMR imaging pave the way for new and innovative 
applications of functional neuroimaging in basic neuroscience and in clinical practice. For 
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example, the presence of reproducible and robust task-dependent fMR imaging responses to 
command without the need for any practice or training2 suggests a novel method by which healthy 
participants and patients may be able to communicate their thoughts to those around them by 
simply modulating their neural activity. The use of functional neuroimaging in this context will 
continue to present innumerable logistic and theoretical problems. However, its clinical and 
scientific implications are so great that such efforts are clearly justified. 
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